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I. Introduction 
This paper focuses on the welfare implications of trade reforms and compensating taxation. 
Recognizing the importance of the revenue-raising aspect of trade barriers, it investigates a direct cost: 
loss of tax revenue from liberalized trade, which must be made up from increases in other distortionary 
taxes. Since this loss can be substantial for developing countries, the welfare implications of trade 
liberalization become an important issue. The net effect can be a loss.  
  It is well-known that distortionary taxes (both domestic and trade) impose welfare costs. 
Collecting $1 tax revenue creates a distortion in the economy which exceeds $1. Hence, all distortionary 
taxes are expensive tools that generate revenue for the government. However, a government with a 
binding budget constraint can still choose between domestic and trade taxes. A useful policy 
recommendation would be to choose the “cheaper” tax, which causes less welfare decrease. This paper 
shows that, for most of the developing countries, trade taxes are the more “expensive” tool compared with 
output taxes1. 
The empirical results illustrate the welfare costs of trade taxes versus output taxes for 32 
countries. For 26 of them, trade taxes are the more “expensive” distortion, hence a trade liberalization 
compensated with an increase in output taxes is welfare improving. The results of this paper might be of 
special interest for developing countries and for organizations like the WTO, the World Bank and IMF, 
which advise developing countries on their economic policies. 
  In recent years, many countries have followed the path of trade liberalization, eliminating or 
lowering their trade barriers, and opening their economies to international competition2. The growth 
 
 
1 This finding is in tune with the well-known principle that the optimal policy for a small country is to raise revenue 
by completely replacing trade taxes with taxes on the net demand of households (Dixit 1985), which is a corollary to 
the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) production efficiency theorem.  
2 In Latin America, trade policy reforms started in countries like Chile and Mexico in the mid-1980s, followed by 
Argentina, Brazil, Peru and Venezuela. In Asia, around the same time, China, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam   2
                                                                                                                                                            
performance of early liberalizers, such as Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, have motivated the 
rest of the developing world to acknowledge trade liberalization as a powerful policy tool to improve their 
economic performance and raise standards of living3. Indeed, trade theory provides us with the insight 
that eliminating trade barriers enhances economic efficiency, promotes growth and helps correct domestic 
market failures. 
Although gains from trade are indisputable in theory, barriers to trade are still widespread in 
practice. There are three main reasons why they are so prevalent: interest groups may favor protection, 
restricting trade can be an optimal policy (infant industry, strategic trade policy, etc...), and finally trade 
barriers raise significant revenue for the government. The last one is the most relevant for developing 
countries4 and the motivation for this paper. 
The current literature on trade liberalization acknowledges that trade taxes constitute an important 
part of government revenue in developing countries and can also be substantial in some cases for 
developed countries. In low income countries trade taxes account for approximately a quarter of the total 
tax revenues5. Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp (1999) report that in a group of selected developing countries in 
Africa, trade taxes account for about 5.5 percent of GDP on average in 1995. Keen and Lightart (1999) 
reveal that tariff revenue accounts for approximately 27 percent of the total tax revenue in Africa, and 
Matusz and Tarr (1999) report that explicit trade taxes account for 38 percent (19 percent) of total 
revenues in low (middle) income countries. According to Evenett and Madani (2000), as a consequence 
of this heavy reliance on trade taxation, “certain developing countries have postponed, slowed or reversed 
trade liberalization measures on the grounds that losses in trade tax revenues undermine their 
 
employed openness policies. Even in Africa, where trade taxes are still higher compared to the rest of the world, 
countries like Ghana, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zaire have recently started to liberalize their trade policies. 
3 Although the most recent round of trade talks in Doha, Qatar, were brought to a standstill in the fall of 2003, 
recently all participants showed interest to carry on with promises to liberalize trade further. There are high 
expectations from this liberalization process. 
4 The cost of raising revenue through domestic taxes is very high in developing countries (such as African 
countries). The lack of necessary infrastructure to monitor, administer and collect domestic taxes makes it easier to 
rely on tariffs.  
5 For OECD countries the same ratio is only 0.5%. From Government Finance Statistics, 1997.   3
                                                
government’s budget constraint.”  
This paper builds on Anderson’s (1999) study by investigating in more depth the Marginal Cost 
of Funds (MCF) calculations for distortionary taxation. MCF for any tax increase is given by the ratio of 
the incremental compensation, which is required to maintain real income to the incremental tax revenue. 
After finding the MCF for two different types of taxes, a revenue neutral shift from the tax with high 
MCF to the tax with low MCF is welfare improving. 
In particular, this paper aims to shed light on the following question: “Are trade taxes “more 
expensive” compared with other distortionary taxes?” If there are “cheaper” distortionary taxes that we 
can replace the trade taxes with, a revenue-neutral trade reform would be welfare improving. This policy 
recommendation would not only rely on the “gains from trade” argument to encourage countries opening 
up to trade, but also address their concerns of losing government revenue. 
  This study contributes to the growing research program on welfare implications of trade 
liberalization in several dimensions. The first is the utilization of an increasingly popular and very 
intuitive welfare measurement tool, the marginal cost of funds (MCF). The second is the large number of 
countries6 that this measurement tool is applied to in the context of a computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) model, to answer the question posed in the title. In contrast to the small number of existing MCF 
calculations in the literature, a common CGE structure is used for the set of countries. Third, the explicit 
usage of intermediate imported inputs to make the model employed in this study more realistic (especially 
for the developing countries). 
  The layout of the paper is as follows. Section II covers prior literature in the field. Section III sets 
out the intuition of the compensated MCF and the formal derivation. Section IV lays out the model. 
 
6 Partially due to complexity of modeling and setting up the SAM (Social Accounting Matrix), most CGE models 
are built to run for only one country. One of the most recent and most comprehensive studies involving MCF figures 
and CGE modeling was done by Devarajan, Thierfelder and Suthiwart-Narueput (2000) and covers only 3 countries 
(Cameroon, Bangladesh and Indonesia).    4
                                                
Section V examines the empirical work, the elasticities employed in the study, the calibration procedure 
and the mechanics of the CGE model. Section VI reports the empirical results. Section VII concludes the 
paper.  
II. Prior Literature 
The literature does not offer much guidance on coordinated tariff-tax reforms, which take into 
account the binding budget constraint of many developing countries. Most of the research on the welfare 
effects of piecemeal trade reform typically employs lump-sum transfers7 to compensate for the revenue 
consequences of the tariff reform. Thus, most of the conventional literature simply assumes no 
distortionary taxes other than tariffs8.  
However, recently, research in the area of coordinating tariff reductions with domestic tax 
reforms has gained momentum9. Clarete and Whalley (1987) find that, at the margin, trade taxes have 
considerably higher distortionary costs per unit of tax revenue raised. According to the theoretical paper 
of Keen and Lightart (1999), combining any tariff cut with a consumption tax reform, which leaves the 
consumer prices unchanged, increases both welfare and public revenue. Their compensating policy tool, 
domestic consumption taxes, differs from the one used in this paper, output taxes10, and their experiment 
is not revenue-neutral. But their findings are consistent with the findings of this paper: tariff reforms are 
favorable in the context of coordinated tariff-tax packages. Rajaram (1994) examines whether the revenue 
effects of tariff reform proposals of the World Bank were anticipated and complemented by other tax 
measures. He finds out that in many cases they are neither anticipated, nor complemented. Abed (1998) 
stresses the link between trade liberalization and domestic tax reform and details the types of tax reforms 
 
7 Note that although it is very convenient to implement, there is no application of “lump sum” taxation into the real 
economy. 
8 The theoretical results of piecemeal policy reform, obtained under the assumption that all distortions are tariffs, 
may not hold if there are other distortions such as a production subsidy/tax, Beghin and Karp (1992).  
9 Clarete and Whalley (1987), Greenaway and Milner (1991), Mitra (1992), Rajaram (1994), Abed (1998), Keen 
and Lightart (1999), Ebrill et al (1999). 
10 Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1982) also employ distortionary taxation on output.   5
                                                
that would support trade reform by generating the compensatory revenue and, in the long run, reduce the 
distortionary effects of tax and tariff systems. Findings in outcome of these studies suggest the necessity 
for further investigation. 
  The starting point for this paper is a study by Anderson (1999), where he determines that a 
revenue neutral trade reform may not always improve welfare. To measure welfare effects, Anderson uses 
the concept of the compensated Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF)11 from the public finance literature and 
generates sufficient conditions for the revenue-neutral trade reform to be welfare increasing. He analyzes 
an example of a simple efficient tax by using a uniform radial change in the consumer tax vector to 
compensate uniform radial reductions in tariffs, in other words, taxing all the consumption at the same 
rate12. In the empirical part of his paper, Anderson presents a small-scale CGE model of the Korean 
economy in 1963, and provides an example of welfare-decreasing replacement, despite higher average 
trade taxes than consumption taxes. His result shows that no presumption is obtained; replacing trade 
taxes with distortionary consumption taxes cause a decrease in welfare. There is a need to investigate 
under which circumstances Anderson’s result is likely, and to study welfare implications for further cases 
of compensation with distortionary taxation. 
  A summary of a literature survey on MCF reveals its differing definitions and widespread usage. 
Ahmad and Stern (1990) contribute to the public finance literature by using the comparison of “marginal 
social costs” to evaluate “shadow” revenue neutral marginal shifts from one tax to another. The difference 
between their approach and the one used in this paper, is that they focus on the role of shadow prices and 
distributional values whereas our results use the compensated13 MCFs to compare policy reforms across 
 
 
11 Explained in detail in section III. 
12 According to Hatta (1977), uniform radial tariff cuts with lump sum taxes are always welfare improving. As 
mentioned before, according to Dixit (1985), the optimal policy for a small country is to raise revenue by completely 
replacing trade taxes with taxes on the net demand of households (which is a straight forward application of the 
Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) theorem that consumption taxes dominate trade taxes at the optimum). 
13 It is important to point out that the MCF used in this study is the compensated version of MCF. A crucial 
property of the compensated MCF concept is that it is comparable across economies, model specifications and 
parameterizations. This allows an investigation into the determinants of differing MCFs. Its use in this research is   6
                                                                                                                                                            
countries. Devarajan, Squire and Suthiwart-Narueput (1995) stress the usefulness of MCF, especially for 
projects that are characterized by public costs and private benefits. Other papers by Mayshar (1991) and 
Allgood and Snow (1998) try to define the different methods of calculating MCF estimates and explain 
the wide discrepancy between the estimates in the literature. Devarajan, Thierfelder and Suthiwart-
Narueput (2000) argue, “if the MCF across different tax instruments varies greatly, directions for 
revenue-neutral tax reform are readily apparent”. They provide MCF estimates for three developing 
countries – Cameroon, Bangladesh and Indonesia, and conclude that “the potential for revenue-neutral (or 
even revenue-increasing) tax reforms in developing countries is enormous.” They claim that MCF 
analysis provides the necessary groundwork for tax reform efforts. Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2001) use the 
MCF as the main concept to evaluate distortionary cost of fund raising. Rutherford (2001) uses MCF for 
5 different tax instruments for Columbia to assess possibilities of tax reform. His analysis is undertaken 
with the Columbian National Department of Planning, confirming the policy makers’ increased attention 
towards MCF estimates. 
  The significance of imported intermediates in trade policy and welfare analysis is repeatedly 
acknowledged in the literature14. For the 32 countries investigated in this paper, the share of imported 
intermediates to total imports is very high (especially for developing countries)15. 
 
different than the prevailing usage in the public economics and relevant trade or tax reform literature (Snow and 
Warren, 1996) where the uncompensated, or money metric utility, version of MCF is widely employed. The 
uncompensated MCF is inherently non-comparable across models or countries because it is a money metric measure 
of utility. A more detailed discussion will follow in section III under “formal derivation”. 
14 Markusen (1989), Lopez and Panagariya (1992), Lopez-de-Silanes, Markusen and Rutherford (1992). 
15 It is about 70% for most of the developing countries. Intuitively, trade taxes impose distortion not only on the 
consumption side but also on the production side. High trade taxes distort the production by causing a shift away 
from imported intermediates toward domestic intermediates. III. Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) 
A) Basic Intuition 
  An increase in taxes will decrease the real income of the consumer and raise tax revenue for the 
government at the same time. The Marginal Cost of Funds (MCF) for any tax increase gives the ratio of 
the marginal compensation required to maintain real income to the marginal tax revenue raised by this tax 
increase. In other words, it is the marginal cost of raising another dollar of tax revenue. 
  Below is the simplest formula of the MCF, where we assume a single imported good. 
  7
p
  Consider a small open economy with an imported good at international price  , which is selling 
domestically for   due to a tariff
p
∗
16. Assume that all goods are tradable, and there are no other distortions 
in the economy. Denoting the quantity of imports by m , MCF after a small perturbation in the tariff can 
be defined as follows: 
MCF =
mdp
[m+ (p − p
∗)mp]dp
 (1) 
where mdp is the marginal compensation and   is the marginal tax revenue change. 
Here and for the remainder of the paper, a subscript denotes partial differentiation. For a single import, 
due to the substitution effect the scalar excess demand slope  <0, hence, MCF>1. Intuitively, it takes 
more than one dollar of compensation to maintain real income, when $1 of added tariff revenue is raised. 
dp m p p m p] ) ( [
∗ − +
p m
                                                 
16 Note that “p” here is the domestic price of a single import, whereas “p” in the formal derivation, on the next 
page, will denote the relative price vector of private goods. B) Formal Derivation 
  The formal derivation uses a simplified version of the model laid out in Section IV and serves 
mainly to verify the intuition.  
  8
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The framework of the model is built on the representative consumer’s expenditure function, 
, and the gross domestic product function,  . 
  The expenditure function,   gives the minimum expenditure on private goods needed to 
reach a utility of u, where   is the relative price vector for private goods. 
) , ( u p e
  The gross domestic product function,   gives the maximized value of private production at 
prices  , where v represents the vector of primary factors of production in a convex technology with 
constant returns to scale (CRS) and perfect competition. By the exhaustion of product theorem, the gross 
domestic product function measures the total payments to factors. 
) , ( v p g
  The following set up gives the simplest case where the public goods are not included in the 
equations to simplify the analysis17. Moreover, the prices of the non-distorted goods are suppressed. 
  The net expenditure on private goods at domestic prices can be defined as 
) , ( ) , ( ) , , ( v p g u p e v u p E − =  (2)18
  The private budget constraint is as follows: 
0 ) , , ( = v u p E   (3)19
 
17 Including an exogenously determined G, and hence using dG=0 would bring us to the same result. 
18 Note that all goods are assumed to be tradable. Otherwise, we must solve for the non-traded goods prices. Non-
traded goods are formally handled by  )] , , ( ) , , ( [ max ) , , ( v h p g u h p e v u p E
h − ≡ . 
19 Note that (3) implies that there are no direct transfers to the representative consumer. denoting the net expenditure on the private goods. 
  The government budget constraint is: 
0 ) , , ( )' ( = − −
∗ β v u p E p p p  (4) 
  The first term gives the tariff revenue of the government where (p − p
∗) denotes the price wedge 
(tariff) and Ep  gives the vector of excess demands. The second term, β , denotes external transfer. 
Eventually, β  will pay for a reduction in revenue from other taxes. 
  Now we can introduce a package of tariff changes by perturbing the domestic price vector  . 
Changes in domestic prices can be denoted as  , where W  is a diagonal matrix of 
weights (i standing for a member of an index set
p
τ
i i ⋅ =
i d p W dp
20) and dτ  is a scalar. 
  The next step is to discuss the effect of an exogenous change in the external transfer,  β d , solved 
for the exogenous change in dp and in welfare du. Totally differentiating the government budget 
constraint: 
β τ τ d du E p p d Wp E p p d Wp E pu pp p = ⋅ − + ⋅ − + ⋅
∗ ∗ )' ( )' ( '
  (5) 
and the private budget constraint: 
du E d Wp E u p − = ⋅ τ '   (6) 
The endogenous tax reduction,  , is financed by this external transfer. In other 
words, government budget constraint is first altered by an external transfer, 
τ pd W dp
i i =
β d , then balanced by an 
endogenous change in taxes,  τ d , where  τ d is given by: 
                                                 
20 For notational convenience, this index will be suppressed in the remainder of the derivation. 
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  Equation (7) is obtained using the government budget constraint only. Solving for  τ d  from the 
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  Substituting (7) into (8) we end up with: 
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≡ , and  (12) 
Ep   denotes the vector of excess demand, 
pp E   is the matrix of compensated price derivatives of excess demand, 
u E   is the change in excess demand with respect to change in utility, 
du E p p pu *)' ( −  is the income effect on tax revenues, and 
  10] / *)' ( 1 /[ 1 u pu E E p p MCF − −   gives the price of an additional unit of money metric utility in 
terms of external compensation, the shadow price of foreign exchange or the fiscal multiplier. 
  The intuition behind the right hand side of (12) is straightforward; the nominator stands for the 
private marginal cost of the tariff change or in other words, it is the magnitude effect of a unit tariff 
change on the representative agent. The denominator gives the net revenue raised by the tariff change. All 
changes are at constant utility (u). Going back to the scalar case introduced in the introduction of this 
section, we can see that (1) and (12) give the same intuition. The MCF in the scalar case can be reduced 
to: 
m m p p
MCF
p / *) ( 1
1
− +
=  (13) 
The nominator reports one unit of external transfers, and the denominator gives the revenue raised due to 
tariff reductions financed by this external transfer. 
  Equation (11) also gives us the direct relationship between the money metric (or the 
uncompensated) and compensated MCF. The difference between these two measures is captured by µ in 
(14) below, known as the “shadow price of foreign exchange” in the international trade literature, also 





p p MCF ) ( 1
1
∗ − −
= µ  (14) 
The fiscal multiplier describes the price of an additional unit of money metric21 utility in terms of 
                                                 
21 Money metric utility measures transform utils into expenditure units. 
  11external compensation22. 
The compensated MCF is simply the money metric MCF (MMCF) divided by this “fiscal 
multiplier”: 
µ / MMCF MCF =  (15) 
MCF, as described in (12), is the compensated (utility constant) marginal cost of raising another 
dollar for external transfer by using tariffs. The fiscal experiment is donating an external dollar to the 
government and inducing a one dollar reduction in tax revenue generated from tariffs. This experiment 
gives us the compensated benefit of MCF, the willingness to pay for a dollar of external transfer to 
finance a tax reduction. The important difference between the money metric version of MCF and the 
compensated MCF is that the money metric version of MCF does not have the “willingness to pay” 
interpretation; hence it doesn’t allow international or interregional comparisons. 
  This experiment can be extended to two sets of taxes23. One group of taxes is altered 
exogenously, and another group of taxes change endogenously to maintain the tax revenue at a constant 
level. For this analysis, we need to calculate   and   for two group of goods i and j, 
respectively. Let   denote the vector of prices of the subset of goods whose tax rates are varied 
exogenously, and   denote the vector of prices of the subset of goods whose tax rates are varied 
endogenously. Defining the exogenous change in taxes for the j set of goods as  , we 
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d p W dp τ =
d p W dp τ ⋅ =
The solution for 
j i d d τ τ  is   (16) 
                                                 
22 The fiscal multiplier is generally positive and greater than one (Hatta, 1997), but may be also less than one under 
some circumstances (Fullerton, 1991).  
23 This section closely follows the setup of the differential tax case by Anderson and Martin (1995). 
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⎟ , which captures the substitution effect. 
Solving 
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p p MCF − −  is the fiscal multiplier for endogenous taxes.  
  The intuition tells us that if the taxes for group i goods are more costly, in other words if   
>  (which indicates that the term in the brackets, 
i MCF









, is positive), an increase in taxes 
for group j goods accompanied by a revenue neutral cut in taxes for group j goods will be welfare 
improving. 
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IV. The Model 
  The computable general equilibrium (CGE) model used in this paper simulates the working of a 
small open market economy. It assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale (CRTS) in 
production. There are three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing and services. Labor and capital are the two 
primary factors used in the production of each sectoral output. They are not sector specific, and are 
perfectly mobile across sectors. Other inputs into the production structure are the domestic and imported 
intermediates, which are imperfectly substitutable for each other. A multi-level nesting of all the factors 
of production constructs the sectoral output. Each sector then decides how much of the sectoral output 
will be produced as exports or domestic products for domestic consumption, which are imperfect 
substitutes in supply. The households and the government consume composite consumption goods, which 
are combinations of domestic and imported consumption goods. The Armington specification between 
imports and domestic goods indicates imperfect substitution in demand. The representative consumer has 
a Cobb-Douglas utility function in the three aggregates. Expenditure functions arise from these Cobb-
Douglas preferences and their CES subutility functions. The household revenue comes from factor 
payments to capital and labor and transfers from the government. Government consumption equals its 
revenue from different types of taxation (including trade taxes) plus foreign transfers (remittances) minus 
transfers to households. In this simple model, the government does not supply a public good. The world 
price of exports and imports is assumed to be exogenous due to the small country assumption. Trade is 
taxed via tariffs on imports. The other distortion is the output tax that applies to all domestic production. 
The social accounting matrix for the benchmark year, the calibration process and the magnitude and 
sources of the elasticities used in CES and CET aggregation functions are discussed in the next sections. 
Figure 1 puts the production block, supply behavior and demand behavior together and gives the sectoral 
flow of commodities in the economy.   15
                                                
V. EMPIRICAL WORK 
A) Data Sources 
  The data set used in the empirical analysis comes primarily from GTAP (Global Trade Analysis 
Project) database. Both, versions GTAP 4 and GTAP 5 were utilized. 
  GTAP 4 database, released in Fall 1998, covers 31 countries. All monetary values of the data are 
in $US millions and the base year for Version 4 is 1995. Most of its tariff information comes from 
UNCTAD TRAINS database. The majority of the macro data on trade is compiled from the United 
Nation’s COMTRADE database. A large number of GTAP 4’s input-output (I/O) tables were initially 
inherited from the Australian Industry Commission’s SALTER project, the rest is compiled from the 
national government (such as departments of statistics) and academic sources for each country. Other data 
sources utilized in GTAP4 are, OECD’s PSE (producer subsidy equivalent) database, Development 
Economics Analytical Data Base (DAD) maintained by the Development Economics Prospects Group of 
the World Bank, various GATT/IDB sources and individual contributors24. 
  GTAP 5 database was released in July 2001, and its regional coverage has been expanded from 
31 to 54 countries. All monetary values of the data are in $US millions and the base year for Version 4 is 
1997. Most of the data resources of GTAP 5 are identical to its previous version. 
An aggregation-constrained software package, GTAPAgg, allows any number of 10x10 (or 
smaller) aggregations of the GTAP Data Package. A 3x3 aggregation has been used to construct the data 
for the social accounting matrix (SAM) of this paper. 
 
24 A detailed documentation for GTAP 4 and GTAP 5 databases can be found at www.gtap.org.   16
                                                
B) Elasticities 
  Table 1 reports the different elasticity values used in the CES and CET functions to mark the 
production, supply and demand choices in the model, and compares them with elasticities used in similar 
CGE models of small open economies. 
  The second column shows the elasticities used in this paper, whereas the third column reports the 
range of estimates from various sources (listed in the footnotes) and the substitution elasticities reported 
in the GTAP documentations. All the elasticities of substitution are constant across all three sectors of the 
economy for all the countries explored in the model25. This simplifying assumption does not change the 
results of the paper. The sensitivity analysis utilized in the next section shows that the empirical MCF 
estimates are not very sensitive to the elasticities of substitution. 
VI. Empirical Analysis and Results 
Before laying out the empirical results of this paper, it is helpful to take a look at the empirical 
magnitudes of the MCF estimates from previous studies. Table 2 includes MCF figures obtained by using 
either analytical formulae or numerical simulation. These empirical results from previous studies present 
a wide range for MCF figures26. 
The CGE model has proved useful for studying the welfare effects of trade reforms in the 
presence of binding government budget constraints. This section reports estimates of MCF
TY and MCF
TM, 
the marginal cost of funds, of indirect taxes, and tariffs, respectively. In the majority of countries (26 out 
 
25 This simplification is mostly due to limitations of availability of elasticity estimates for the countries in the 
sample. 
26 It is important to note that the MCFs reported above are the money metric or uncompensated version of the MCF. 
As explained in section III, the uncompensated and compensated MCF concepts are linked to each other with the 
“fiscal multiplier”: the compensated MCF is simply the uncompensated MCF divided by the “fiscal multiplier”. 
Since the “fiscal multiplier” is generally positive and greater than one (Hatta (1977)), the compensated MCFs are 
smaller in absolute value than their money metric versions. The results presented below are for the compensated 
version of MCF, and have a narrower range (1.001-1.558) for 32 countries than the uncompensated MCF figures 
reported in Table 1. 
   17
                                                
of 32), the MCF for indirect taxes (MCF
TY) is lower than the MCF for tariffs (MCF
TM). This comparison 
tells us, that for the first six countries reported in Table 3, the trade taxes are the “cheaper” distortion, and 
therefore replacing indirect taxes with trade taxes is beneficial. This finding implies that a trade 
liberalization package, where the tariff loss will be compensated with an increase in indirect taxes, will be 
too costly (in welfare terms) for the consumer in the first six countries in Table 3, but the preferred policy 
tool for the remainder of the 32 countries. 
To enhance the intuition, going over the MCF results of one country can be helpful: For Turkey, 
the MCF for tariffs is 1.27, and the MCF for indirect taxes is 1.041. These estimates are reasonable since 
their magnitudes are similar to the figures presented in Table 2. These results show that the MCF for 
indirect taxes is significantly lower than the MCF for tariffs for Turkey. These findings for Turkey are in 
the expected direction, since the output taxes in the model are low (between zero and 5.8%) and the tariffs 
are relatively higher (they go up to 21%). The comparison of MCF
TY and MCF
TM gives us the answer to 
the original question: “Are trade taxes the more expensive revenue generating policy tool?” 
In the simplest sense, we can say that to raise $1, while keeping the government budget constraint 
constant27, one has to spend $1.27 when using tariffs as the policy tool, and only $1.041 when using the 
output taxes. Hence, output taxes are the “cheaper” distortion, and therefore replacing trade taxes with 
indirect taxes is beneficial. Trade taxes are relatively more expensive for Turkey. 
As explained in Section III, the MCF figures in Table 3 reflect each country’s willingness to pay 
for a dollar of external transfer to finance a tax reduction. The net benefit of tax reform which switches 
from trade to production taxes can be determined from Table 3. It is simply given by MCF(trade) - 
MCF(production). Korea, China, Poland and the Philippines have the highest potential welfare gains. 
Their welfare gain would be $0.354, $0.288, $0.251 and $0.24, respectively, for each dollar raised, if they 
switched from tariffs to output taxes as the revenue collecting policy instrument. Finland, Turkey, 
 
27 Government consumption is fixed, and equal to government revenue.   18
Vietnam, Zambia and Tanzania also gain significantly from a tax reform, whereas Argentina, Venezuela 
and Singapore gain only $0.022, $0.022 and $0.039, respectively. 
C) Sensitivity Analysis 
As seen in Table 4, the MCF figures are not very sensitive to changes in the elasticity of 
substitution between imported goods and domestic products (Armington elasticity). Elasticities up to 25% 
above and below the benchmark year elasticity (EPSI=2) do not affect the direction of the results. In other 
words, MCF
TM remains higher than MCF
TY over the entire range, indicating that replacing trade taxes 
with output taxes would be welfare improving for the economy in question. 
From the sample countries presented above, we can calculate the empirically determined 
elasticity of the MCF with respect to the elasticity of substitution. For MCF
TM (tariffs) the elasticity is 
within the range of 0.0122 and 0.0408, and for MCF
TY (output taxes), it is even smaller, between 4x10
-4 
and 0.0186. Intuitively, MCFs rise as elasticity of substitution increases, showing that the own terms have 
greater responsiveness with respect to changes in elasticity of substitution than cross-effect terms. 
 
VII. Conclusion  
  Trade taxes constitute an important source of revenue for most developing countries. In many 
cases, a tariff reform can considerably decrease government revenue and pose a serious fiscal challenge. 
The fiscal impact of the tariff reduction depends directly on the size of the tariff cut, the responsiveness of 
imports to the tax change, relative importance of import tariffs as a source of government revenue, and 
indirectly on what happens to the other tax bases. In theory, many studies conveniently offset the revenue 
loss of the government by a hypothetical lump-sum transfer. However, in practice lump-sum transfers do 
not exist. Lately, the importance of the revenue implications of trade liberalization has been widely 
acknowledged among economists, especially in international organizations such as the World Bank and   19
                                                
the IMF. Recent policy recommendations that have evolved from their research on the interaction of trade 
liberalization and domestic tax systems suggest that for developing countries with binding government 
budget constraints, it is a priority to implement comprehensive reform packages of the domestic tax 
system to accompany trade liberalization28. 
  This paper investigates whether trade taxes or output taxes will be more costly in welfare terms. 
A CGE model for a small open economy is employed to investigate a sample of 32 countries. The 
production structure assumes perfect competition and constant returns to scale. Intermediate imported 
inputs are nested within the production structure. To raise the same amount of revenue for the 
government, trade taxes and output taxes are used as policy tools. They each impact the welfare of the 
consumer differently. A comparison is made by using the marginal cost of funds as the measurement tool 
for these welfare implications. Switching from the “more expensive” distortion (in welfare terms) to the 
“cheaper” one would be welfare increasing. Countries with higher marginal cost of funds estimates for 
tariffs than for other revenue raising tools, such as the output taxes, will be better off at the end of a tariff 
reform. 
The results of the empirical part of this paper indicate that for 26 out of 32 countries investigated 
in this study, trade taxes are the “more expensive” distortion. In other words, a tariff cut, financed by 
raising the indirect taxes to compensate the government for the lost tariff revenue, would be welfare 
increasing. The relevant policy recommendation that emerges from these results is that there is still a 
strong potential for many countries to liberalize their trade. This would not only satisfy international 
organizations that advocate for freer trade, but also be welfare improving for the liberalizing country. The 
fact that 24 of these 26 countries are developing countries makes this recommendation even more 
encouraging. Essentially, as stated in the title, trade taxes are expensive29. 
 
 
28 See Ebrill, Stotsky and Gropp (1999). 
29 Intuitively, the presence of imports in both the production and the consumption side increases the amount of 
distortions that are imposed by a tariff, thereby making the taxes on imports an “expensive” policy tool. The model 
employed in this paper allows for a realistic presentation of the distortions in the economy, which turns out to be   20
                                                                                                                                                            
The empirical results for MCF estimates appear reasonable based on the range of the estimates 
obtained from the literature (Table 1). They are also not sensitive to the choice of elasticity of substitution 
(Table 4). The results are promising in that they offer an opportunity of welfare gain along with trade 
liberalization for many countries in the sample. Korea, China, Poland and the Philippines have the highest 
potential welfare gains. Their welfare gain would be $0.354, $0.288, $0.251 and $0.24, respectively, for 
each dollar raised, if they switched from tariffs to output taxes as the revenue collecting policy 
instrument.  
  These results encourage further research with different policy tools and different model 
specifications. Introduction of distortionary income taxation, taxes on private domestic consumption, 
value-added taxes or other distortions, such as quotas, including the cost of tax administration in the 
model, along with making the model dynamic, would provide new marginal cost of funds estimates, 
which could help shape policy recommendations for developing countries. 
 
crucial for making the correct policy recommendations. Preliminary results of this paper, reported from a smaller 
sample (only 15 countries) and a simpler model (treating imports only as final goods, and omitting imported 
intermediate inputs in production), suggested that trade taxes are actually the “cheaper” distortion for 11 out of 15 
countries.   21
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Figure 1: Flow of Commodities 
 
 
   27




σi elasticity of substitution between capital and labor 
 (production - CES) 1
1.2 0.9-1.8 
υi elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported inputs 
(production - CES) 2
2 0.4-3.55 
τi, elasticity of substitution between value added and composite 
intermediate (production - CES) 3
0.1 0-1.68 
ELAi, elasticity of substitution between exports and domestically 
consumed domestic products (supply – CET) 4
3 2.9-3.9 
EPSIi, elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic products 
(demand – CES) 5
2 0.4-3.55 
 
                                                 
1 Griliches (1967), Dhrymes and Zarembka (1970), Zarembka (1970), Fishelson (1979), and Moroney (1972). 
2 De Melo and Tarr (1992). 
3 Close to Leontief function (perfectly inelastic). 
4 De Melo and Tarr (1992). 
5 De Melo and Tarr (1992), Anderson (1999).   28
Table 2: MCF Estimates from Previous Studies 
Country Tax  Type  Estimate Source 
United States  Surcharge  1.17-1.56 Ballard, Shoven and 
Whalley (1985) 
   Labor  1.21-1.24 Stuart (1984) 
   Labor  1.32-1.47 Browning (1987) 
   Labor  1.08-1.14 Ahmed and Croushore 
(1994) 
Sweden  Surcharge  0.67-4.51 Hansson and Stuart (1995) 
New Zealand  Labor  1.18  Diewert and Lawrence 
(1994) 
India  Excise  1.66-2.15 Ahmed and Stern (1987) 
   Sales  1.59-2.17 Ahmed and Stern (1987) 
   Import  1.54-2.17 Ahmed and Stern (1987) 
Bangladesh  Import  0.82-2.18 Devarajan, Thierfelder and 
Suthiwart-Narueput (2000) 
Cameroon  Indirect 
Taxes 
0.48-1.32 Devarajan, Thierfelder and 
Suthiwart-Narueput (2000) 
Indonesia  Imports  0.70-1.91 Devarajan, Thierfelder and 
Suthiwart-Narueput (2000)   29
Table 3: Multi-country MCF results 
  COUNTRY  MCF
TM MCF
TY
1  JAPAN  1.125 1.442
2  MEXICO  1.024 1.340
3  SRI LANKA  1.241 1.337
4  SWEDEN  1.176 1.200
5  G.BRITAIN  1.016 1.173
6  DENMARK  1.013 1.029
   MCF
TM<MCF
TY
       
1  CHINA  1.556 1.268
2  KOREA  1.488 1.134
3  SINGAPORE  1.372 1.333
4  INDIA  1.311 1.155
5  VENEZUELA  1.295 1.273
6  VIETNAM  1.281 1.078
7  TURKEY  1.270 1.041
8  GERMANY  1.262 1.207
9  ZAMBIA  1.255 1.062
10 POLAND  1.252 1.001
11 PHILLIPINES  1.241 1.001
12 FINLAND  1.241 1.008
13 THAILAND  1.206 1.122
14 URUGUAY  1.200 1.026
15 TANZANIA  1.196 1.010
16 PERU  1.176 1.003
17 MOROCCO  1.153 1.002
18 UGANDA  1.148 1.000
19 ZIMBABWE  1.139 1.001
21 HUNGARY  1.106 1.005
22MOZAMBIQUE 1.105 1.052
23 BOTSWANA 1.099 1.001
24 MALAYSIA  1.092 1.037
25 CHILE  1.083 0.995
26 INDONESIA  1.060 1.001
27 ARGENTINA 1.057 1.035
   MCF
TM>MCF
TY  30
Table 4: Sensitivity Analysis 






-25%(EPSI=1.5) 1.239416  1.00073 
0% (EPSI=2)  1.252193 1.000731 
25%(EPSI=2.5) 1.26335  1.000732 
 






-25%(EPSI=1.5) 1.10244  1.05041 
0% (EPSI=2)  1.10582 1.0517 
25%(EPSI=2.5) 1.11013  1.05466 
 






-25%(EPSI=1.5) 1.16517  1.19403 
0% (EPSI=2)  1.17577 1.1996 
25%(EPSI=2.5) 1.18452  1.20337 
 
                                                 
1 Reminder: EPSI denotes the substitution elasticity between imported goods and domestic products (Armington 
elasticity). APPENDIX 
(for referees - not for publication) 
A) Calculating MCFs in the Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) Model 
  To understand the mechanics of the empirical work, it is essential to mention once again that the 
MCF figures calculated here stem from a “compensated equilibrium”. In CGE models, such as the one 
employed in this study, more than one step is required to obtain the compensated MCF. 
  Below, the procedure of calculating MCF of trade taxes is laid out: 
¾  In the first step, the model is perturbed with a transfer of a small external exogenous amount, 
β d
i
, into the government budget. This amount is offset by an endogenous proportionate change 
in the trade tax vector,  , where i i i d p W dp τ = i dτ , is the endogenous scalar. The simulation 
calculates the change in money metric utility, 
β d
udu E
, in equation (15). This is the uncompensated 
MCF (MMCF) for trade taxes. 
¾  Second step starts with the injection of the same small external exogenous amount,  β d , into the 
government budget. However, this time it is offset by a lump sum transfer,  θ d , from the 
government to the private sector. Running the CGE model, the change in money metric utility, µ, 
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 (A3) 
In (A3), (A2) is solved for MCF given the calculations of µ and MMCF. 
The calculation of MCF of indirect taxes follows the same structure.  
GAMS (General Algebraic Modeling System) system is employed to solve the CGE model and to 




1 µ is derived by subbing  β τ
β
θ
d E p p
d
d
pu / )' (
∗ − + =  (government budget constraint) into the private 
government budget constraint, and solving for the rate of change in money metric utility. 
  2B) Details of the Model
Below is the equation by equation mathematical model statement2.  
I. Production Block, Factor Markets and Intermediate Inputs 
  The domestic production process combines value added (VA) from labor (L) and capital (K) and 
composite intermediate input (V) from domestic (X) and imported intermediate inputs (XI) to produce 
goods and services on a sectoral basis according to the nested constant elasticity of substitution (CES) 
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, COMPOSITE INTERMEDIATE   (B3) 
relates the composite intermediate to imported (XIi) and domestic intermediate inputs (Xi). The subscript 
“i” stands for the 3 different sectors of the model, where i=agriculture, industry or services. 
  Yi denotes the sectoral output,  
  VAi is the value-added, 
  Vi is the composite intermediate input 
  Li and Ki are the two factors of production, labor and capital, 
                                                 
2 The model presented here is in concordance with most of the standard CGE models in GAMS and it follows the 
neoclassical-structuralist modeling tradition that is presented in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1981). A more 
detailed discussion on the choice of the structure of the model and functional forms can be found in, “A Standard 
CGE Model in GAMS,” by Löfgren, Lee Harris and Robinson (2001) and “CGE Modeling for Regional Analysis,” 
by Schreiner, Marcouiller, Tembo and Vargas (1999). 
  3  Xi and XIi are domestic and imported intermediate goods used in production, 
  TOPi, ADi and AVDi are shift parameters, 
   hi,γi and ki are share parameters (also known as the distribution parameters)  
  τi, σi and υi are the elasticities of substitution between VAi and Vi, Li and Ki, and Xi and XIi 
respectively3. 
In setting out (B3) as it is, substitution between sectoral domestic intermediates is suppressed, and the 
same is true for sectoral imported intermediates. 
The marginal products of factors of production, wage and rent, are derived from the value-added 
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− , RENTS  (B5)  
where PVAi stands for the price of the value-added good. 
In other words, at the sectoral level, value added consists of payments to both labor and capital: 
   (B6)    i i i i i i K RENT L WAGE VA PVA + = ⋅
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3 Section IV looks into elasticities in more detail. 
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  The total supply of labor and capital are assumed to be invariant with respect to the wage rate and 
rent. Both of the factors of production are assumed to be perfectly mobile across all three sectors4, 
therefore their returns are the same across all sectors, and the labor market and capital market equilibrium 
conditions are given by: 
   and  ,  (B9) and (B10)  L L
i
i = ∑ K K
i
i = ∑
where L and K represent the fixed amounts of endowments obtained from the SAM (social accounting 
matrix) of the benchmark year. 
Similarly, the prices of intermediate inputs, PXi and PXIi, can be derived from the composite 
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−  (B12) 
where PXV is the price of the composite intermediate good. 
At the sectoral level, value of the composite intermediate inputs consists of payments to both domestic 
and imported intermediate inputs.  
  i i i i i i XI PXI X PX V PXV ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅  (B13) 
                                                 
4 Alternatively, capital could be assumed sector specific  i i K K = , where  i K is the fixed stock of capital by 
sector. In that case, the return of capital (RENT) would be determined as a residual from equation (B5) after labor is 
paid the value of its marginal product. 
  5where is the price of the composite intermediate good. 
  The sectoral demand for domestic and imported intermediates are determined by equations B14 
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II. Supply Behavior 
  Above, we laid out the choice of the producer between factors of production and intermediate 
inputs. After the producer decides on the combination of inputs, the next choice he faces is either to 
produce for the domestic market or for the export market. At this stage, sectoral domestic output is 
allocated between exports and domestic sales on the assumption that suppliers minimize cost (or 
maximize sales revenue) for any aggregate output level. The CET (constant returns to transformation) 
joint production (or also referred to as output transformation) function marks this choice, which makes the 
domestic products and exports imperfect substitutes in supply. The CET function, which applies to 
commodities that are both exported and sold domestically, is identical to a CES function except for 
negative elasticities of substitution. 
1
1 1 1
) ) 1 ( (
+
+ +







i DO i i E i i CETS i Y α α , CET Function  (B16) 
relates exports to domestic products in production 
  Yi denotes the sectoral output,  
  Ei is the exported good, 
  DOi is the domestic good, 
  CETSi is the shift parameter, 
  6   αi is the share parameter (also known as the distribution parameter)  
  ELA is the CET elasticity of substitution between Ei and DOi. 
The export supply and the supply of domestic products are determined by solving the optimization 
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  (B17) and (B18) 
 where PWEi is the world price of the exports (exogenous due to the small country assumption) and PDi 
stands for the price of the domestic good. Equation (B18) defines the optimal mix between exports and 
domestic sales. It is derived from the first-order conditions for cost minimization (or revenue 
maximization) of the producer (B17) and assures that an increase in export price-domestic price ratio will 
generate an increase in the export-domestic demand ratio (a shift towards the higher price). 
At the sectoral level, value of the gross output is equal to the value of exports plus the value of 
domestic products. 
  i i i i i i DO PD E PWE Y PY ⋅ + ⋅ = ⋅  (B19) 
PYi is the price of the sectoral output. 
 
III. Demand Behavior 
  Imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic outputs sold domestically is captured by 
a two CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregation functions, one for the households and the other 
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  7where, 
  QHHi denotes the household composite good, 
  QGOVi denotes the government composite good, 
  HCIMPi is the household consumption of the imported goods, 
  HCDOMi is the household consumption of the domestic good 
  GCIMPi is the government consumption of the imported goods, 
  GCDOMi is the government consumption of the domestic good 
  ARMIi and ARMIIi are the shift parameters, 
  βi
h, βi
g, are the Armington share parameters between imports and domestic goods for households 
and the government, respectively, 
  EPSI is the CES elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic products.  
These functions are often referred to as “Armington” functions5. The prices and the substitution 
elasticities that the consumers and government face are the same, and the domestic demands by the 
households and the government are for composite commodities that are made up of imports and domestic 
outputs. The household and government Armington functions, (B22) and (B23) above, relate imported 
goods to domestic products in consumption, for the households and the government, respectively. 
  At the sectoral level, imports are equal to the sum of the household demand for imported goods, 
the government demand for imported goods and the demand for intermediate imported inputs: 
  i i i i XI GOVIMP HCIMP IMP + + =  (B22) 
where IMP is the sectoral import. 
Similarly, domestic sales are equal to the sum of the household demand for domestic goods, the 
government demand for domestic goods and the demand for intermediate domestic inputs: 
                                                 
5 Named after Paul Armington who introduced imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic 
commodities in economic models (Armington 1969). 
  8  i i i i X GOVDOM HCDOM DO + + =  (B23) 
 
IV. Households 
The household revenue is the sum of received payments to factors of productions and transfers 
from the government:  
THG K RENT L WAGE HR + ⋅ + ⋅ =  (B24) 
THG is the lump-sum transfer from government to the households (or vice versa), determined residually 
to clear the market. 
The utility of the consumer is modeled as a Cobb-Douglas function: 
   (B25) 
i HBS
i
i QHH UTILITY ∏ =
  The consumer derives utility from consuming the household composite good, a mix of household 
consumption of domestic and imported goods from all three sectors. 
  The Marshallian consumer demand functions are derived maximizing the utility function subject 
to the household budget constraint: 














   
max
which leads to  
  , (B27)  i i i P HR HBS QHH / * =
where  , is the household budget share  (B28)  HR QHH HBS i i / =
Starting with the Cobb-Douglas utility function of the consumer from (B26), the expenditure 
function (EFCT) is derived: 











* ∏ =  (B29) 
The money metric version of marginal cost of funds (MCF) is then calculated by using the utility 
and expenditure functions: 
  ] [ * 0 1 0 UTILITY UTILITY ECOEFF MMCF − = , where  (B30)6










ECOEFF  is the price part of the expenditure function  (B31) 
V. Government Sector and the Tax Structure 
  The model has two tax instruments; tariffs on imports and output taxes on domestically produced 
goods. Government revenues are determined by: 
  THG REMIT TARIFF INTAX GR − + + = , (B32) 
where INTAX is the indirect tax revenue, TARIFF stands for the tariff revenue, REMIT for remittances 
from abroad and THG is a lump-sum transfer from government to the households (or vice versa). 
  The market clearing condition in the government sector is: 
  , (B33)  ∑ =
i
i QGOV GR
where QGOVi represents the government consumption (see (B23)). 
  Both REMIT and THG are aggregates over all three sectors and are determined residually to clear 
the balance of payments and the government equilibria, respectively. REMIT balances the differences 
between the exports and imports of the economy, and THG makes sure that the government revenue is 
equal to the total government consumption. 
                                                 
6 Equation B25 calculates the familiar money metric utility (using old prices as base): 
, and it is equal to  ) , ( ) , ( 1
0 0 0 U p E U p E MO − =
β d
du Eu  in equation (15). 
 
  10i) Tariffs 
   (B34)  ) 1 ( i i i PROPTM PWM PM + =
is the domestic price of imported goods.   stands for the world price of imports.  i PWM
  is the tariff rate, and  (B35)  ) /( i i i i TARIFF IMP TARIFF TM − =
   (B36)  DTM TM PROPTM i i =
gives the change in the tariff rate, where   depicts the radial cut (same across all three sectors) in the 
tariff rate
DTM
7. Modeling the radial tax cut across the sectors is essential for the calculation of the marginal 
cost of funds8.  
  Rearranging (B35) and (B36): 
   (B37)  ∑ ⋅ ⋅ =
i
i i i i IMP PWM PROPTM TARIFF
Tariffs also apply to imported intermediate inputs: 
  , (B38)  ) 1 ( i i i PROPTM PXIT PXI + =
where PXITi is the price for intermediate imported inputs net of tariffs. 
ii) Output Taxes 
 Similarly,   
   (B39)  ) 1 ( i i i PROPTY PY PYT + =
stands for the domestic price of sectoral output gross of taxes, where   is the price of output net of 
taxes. 
i PY
   (B40)  DTY TY PROPTY i i =
gives the change in the output tax rate, where  
  11
                                                 
7 The radial cut in the tariff rate implies that the change in all three sectors is the same percentage (for example, a 
5% cut in tariffs for agricultural and industrial products and services). 
8 The radial cut is explained in Section III, and built in the formal derivation of the MCF.   is the output tax rate,  (B41)  ) /( i i i i INDTAX Y INDTAX TY − =
and DTY  depicts the radial cut (same across the three sectors) in the tariff rate. 
Rearranging (B41) and (B42), we obtain: 
   (B42)  ∑ ⋅ ⋅ =
i
i i i i Y PYT PROPTY INDTAX
VI. Closure Rules 
  The model includes four macroeconomic balances:  
the government balance,  , stated in (3.31),   THG QGOV GR
i
i + =∑
the external balance, 




i i i IMP PWM WS E PWE
and the two factor market equilibrium conditions,  L L
i
i = ∑  and  K K
i
i = ∑ , stated in (B9) and (B10). 
  In addition, the government consumption is set fixed to its initial value to mark the binding 
budget constraint of the government. 
  Both, world prices of imports and exports, PWMi and PWEi, are exogenous due to the small 
country assumption. 
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C) Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) 
  A Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) is a comprehensive, economy wide data framework, typically 
presenting the economy of a nation. Table C1 shows the SAM employed in the empirical part of this 
paper. 
Table C1: Basic SAM structure used in the CGE model 
  Agr  Ind  Serv 




































Labor  factor payments  factor payments  factor payments 
Capital  factor payments  factor payments  factor payments 
Ind-tax  output taxes  output taxes  output taxes 
Duties  tariffs tariffs  tariffs 
Imports  imports imports  imports 










































DomesOut  domestic sales of 
domestic output 
domestic sales of 
domestic output 
domestic sales of 
domestic output 
  Note that the SAM used in this paper doesn’t follow the principle of double-entry, and hence is 
not a square matrix. The first 3x6 submatrix (3 columns, 6 rows) builds the I-O (input-output) matrix for   14
                                                
domestic and imported intermediate inputs which enter into the production structure9. The rows “Labor” 
and “Capital” are factor payments from the three different sectors in the economy. The indirect tax (Ind-
tax) used in the empirical analysis is the output tax that the government collects from the producers. 
“Duties” report the import taxes, “Imports” and “Exports” are the values of trade outflow and inflow. The 
household consumption is detailed in “Hous-Con”, household consumption of domestic goods, and 
“Imp.Hous-Con”, household consumption of imported goods. The same separation holds for the 
government sector. “DomesOut” gives the domestic sales of domestic output. The total domestic output is 
the sum of “Export” and “DomesOut”. Output taxes apply to total domestic output. All entries are in $US 
millions.  
The calibration is done with the benchmark data presented in the SAM. All the shift and share 
parameters for the CES and CET functions are calculated using the benchmark values.  
In the production block, TOPi, ADi and AVDi are the shift parameters and hi,γi and ki are the 
share parameters for the CES functions, stated in (B1), (B2) and (B3). 
CETSi is the shift parameter for the CET function in (B16), and αi is the share parameter 
indicating the share of exports in the sectoral output. 
In the demand block, ARMIi and ARMIIi are the shift parameters and βi
h, and βi
g, are the share 
parameters for the Armington functions in (B20) and (B21). 
The shift parameters are also known as the efficiency parameters or the parameters indicating the 
state of technology. After they are calibrated from the benchmark data, they stay constant throughout the 
analysis. The share parameters, also known as the distribution parameters, give the relative shares of the 
inputs into the corresponding CES/CET functions (e.g: γi is the relative share of labor in production). 




9 See the previous section for the production structure. 